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Essential elements of a 
defense-review of DNA 
testing results
Forensic Bioinformatics 
(www.bioforensics.com)
Dan E. Krane, Wright State University, Dayton, OH
The science of DNA profiling is 
sound.
But, not all of DNA profiling is 
science.
Three generations of DNA testing
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DNA content of biological samples:
Type of sample Amount of DNA
Blood 30,000 ng/mL
stain 1 cm   in area 200 ng
stain 1 mm   in area 2 ng
Semen 250,000 ng/mL
Postcoital vaginal swab 0 - 3,000 ng
Hair
plucked
shed
1 - 750 ng/hair
1 - 12 ng/hair
Saliva
Urine
5,000 ng/mL
1 - 20 ng/mL
2
2
Automated STR Test
The ABI 310 Genetic Analyzer
ABI 310 Genetic Analyzer:
Capillary Electrophoresis
•Amplified STR DNA 
injected onto column
•Electric current 
applied
•DNA separated out by 
size:
– Large STRs travel 
slower
– Small STRs travel 
faster
•DNA pulled towards 
the positive electrode
•Color of STR detected 
and recorded as it 
passes the detector
Detector
Window
Profiler Plus: Raw data
Statistical estimates: the product rule
0.222 x 0.222 x 2
= 0.1
Statistical estimates: the product rule
= 0.1
1 in 79,531,528,960,000,000
1 in 80 quadrillion
1 in 10 1 in 111 1 in 20
1 in 22,200
x x
1 in 100 1 in 14 1 in 81
1 in 113,400
x x
1 in 116 1 in 17 1 in 16
1 in 31,552
x x
What more is there to say after you 
have said: “The chance of a 
coincidental match is one in 80 
quadrillion?”
What more is there to say after you 
have said: “The chance of a 
coincidental match is one in 80 
quadrillion?”
• Two samples really do have the same 
source
• Samples match coincidentally
• An error has occurred
The science of DNA profiling is 
sound.
But, not all of DNA profiling is 
science.
Opportunities for subjective 
interpretation?
Can “Tom” be excluded?
Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
Opportunities for subjective 
interpretation?
Can “Tom” be excluded?
Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
No -- the additional alleles at D3 and FGA 
are “technical artifacts.”
Opportunities for subjective 
interpretation?
Can “Dick” be excluded?
Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
Dick 12, 17 15, 17 20, 25
Opportunities for subjective 
interpretation?
Can “Dick” be excluded?
Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
Dick 12, 17 15, 17 20, 25
No -- stochastic effects explain peak height 
disparity in D3; blob in FGA masks 20 allele.
Opportunities for subjective 
interpretation?
Can “Harry” be excluded?
Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
Dick 12, 17 15, 17 20, 25
Harry 14, 17 15, 17 20, 25
No -- the 14 allele at D3 may be missing due to 
“allelic drop out”; FGA blob masks the 20 allele.
Opportunities for subjective 
interpretation?
Can “Sally” be excluded?
Suspect D3 vWA FGA
Tom 17, 17 15, 17 25, 25
Dick 12, 17 15, 17 20, 25
Harry 14, 17 15, 17 20, 25
Sally 12, 17 15, 15 20, 22
No -- there must be a second contributor; 
degradation explains the “missing” FGA allele.
What can be done to make DNA 
testing more objective?
• Distinguishing between signal and noise
• Deducing the number of contributors to 
mixtures
• Accounting for relatives
• Be mindful of the potential for human 
error
Many opportunities to measure baseline
Background noise
RFU levels at all non-masked data 
collection points
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Variation in baseline noise levels
Positive Control  µb σb µb + 3σb µb + 10σb 
 Maximum  6.7 6.9 27.4 75.7 
 Average  5.0 3.7 16.1 42.0 
 Minimum 3.7 2.4 10.9 27.7 
      
Negative Control  µb σb µb + 3σb µb + 10σb 
 Maximum  13.4 13.2 53.0 145.4 
 Average  5.4 3.9 17.1 44.4 
 Minimum 4.0 2.6 11.8 30.0 
      
Reagent Blank  µb σb µb + 3σb µb + 10σb 
 Maximum  6.5 11.0 39.5 116.5 
 Average  5.3 4.0 17.3 45.3 
 Minimum 4.0 2.6 11.8 30.0 
All three controls 
averaged  µb σb µb + 3σb µb + 10σb 
 Maximum 7.1 7.3 29.0 80.1 
 Average 5.2 3.9 16.9 44.2 
 Minimum 3.9 2.5 11.4 28.9 
 
Average ( b) and standard deviation (⌠b) values with corresponding 
LODs and LOQs from positive, negative and reagent blank controls in 
50 different runs.  BatchExtract: ftp://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/forensics/
Lines in the sand: a two-person mix?
Two reference samples in a 1:10 ratio (male:female).  Three different 
thresholds are shown: 150 RFU (red); LOQ at 77 RFU (blue); and LOD 
at 29 RFU (green).  Gilder et al., January 2007 JFS.
Not all signal comes from DNA 
associated with an evidence sample
• Stutter peaks
• Pull-up (bleed through)
• Spikes and blobs
Stutter peaks
The reality of n+4 stutter
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Primary peak height vs. n+4 stutter peak height.  Evaluation of 37 data points, 
R2=0.293, p=0.0005.  From 224 reference samples in 52 different cases.  A filter 
of 5.9% would be conservative.  Rowland and Krane, accepted with revision 
by JFS.
Pull-up (and software differences)
Advanced Classic
Spikes
• 89 samples (references, pos controls, neg controls)
• 1010 “good” peaks
• 55 peaks associated with 24 spike events
• 95% boundaries shown
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What can be done to make DNA 
testing more objective?
• Distinguishing between signal and noise
• Deducing the number of contributors to 
mixtures
• Accounting for relatives
• Be mindful of the potential for human 
error
Mixed DNA samples
How many contributors to a mixture if 
analysts can discard a locus?
?
Maximum # of 
alleles observed in 
a 3 person mixture # of occurrences Percent of cases
2 0 0.00
3 310 0.00
4 2,498,139 5.53
5 29,938,777 66.32
6 12,702,670 28.14
There are 45,139,896 possible different 3-way mixtures of the 648 
individuals in the MN BCI database (Paoletti et al., November 2005 JFS).
8,151
1,526,550
32,078,976
11,526,219
0.02
3.38
71.07
25.53
What can be done to make DNA 
testing more objective?
• Distinguishing between signal and noise
• Deducing the number of contributors to 
mixtures
• Accounting for relatives
• Be mindful of the potential for human 
error
Accounting for relatives
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Randomized Individuals
Simulated Cousins
Simulated Siblings
Familial searches
• 2003 North Carolina performed post-
conviction DNA testing on evidence from a 
1984 rape and murder
• Exonerated Darryl Hunt, who had served 18 
years of a life sentence
• Database search yielded best match to 
Anthony Brown with 16/26 alleles
• Brother Willard Brown tested and found to 
be a perfect match
Thresholds for similarity
• Virginia: “be very, very close”
• California: “appear useful”
• Florida: match at least 21 out of 26 
alleles
• North Carolina:  16 out of 26 is enough
Is 16/26 close enough?
• How many pairs of individuals match at 
16+ alleles in the previous experiments 
with unrelated databases of size… 
• 1,000: 562 pairs of individuals
• 5,000: 13,872 pairs of individuals
• 10,000: 52,982 pairs of individuals
Is the true DNA match a sibling or a 
random individual?
• Given a closely matching profile, who is 
more likely to match, a sibling or a 
randomly chosen, unrelated individual?
• Use a likelihood ratio (Paoletti et al., 
Winter 2006 Jurimetrics)
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Probabilities of siblings matching at 
0, 1 or 2 alleles
• Weir and NRC I only present 
probabilities that siblings match 
perfectly.
Probabilities of parent/child 
matching at 0, 1 or 2 alleles
• Weir and NRC I only present 
probabilities that parent/child match 
perfectly.
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Considering rarity of alleles
• As few as 5/26 rare alleles
• 13/26 average alleles
• 15/26 common alleles
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Thresholds for similarity
• Virginia: “be very, very close”
• California: “appear useful”
• Florida: match at least 21 out of 26 
alleles
• North Carolina:  16 out of 26 is enough
CODIS search simulation
Relationship
Average 
alleles
Std dev 
alleles
Average 
loci
Std dev 
loci
CODIS 
High
CODIS 
Medium
CODIS 
Low
20+ allele 
matches
Siblings 16.6 2.3 11.6 1.1
3.21E-
06 9 2349 946
Parent-Child 15.8 1.5 13.0 0.0
1.46E-
09 1 10000 96
Half-sibling 12.3 2.1 10.3 1.4
9.37E-
12 0 466 1
Cousins 10.5 2.2 8.9 1.6
2.72E-
13 0 70 0
Uncle/Nephew 12.3 2.1 10.3 1.4
9.40E-
12 0 464 3
Grandparent-
Grandchild 12.3 2.1 10.3 1.5
9.37E-
12 0 496 3
Unrelated 8.7 2.2 7.6 1.7
1.61E-
15 0 10 0
10,000 pairs of each group
Likelihood ratio approach
Relationship LR > 1 LR > 10000
Actual Siblings : Unrelated 9967 4590
Actual Parent/Child : Unrelated 9999 2807
Actual Half-Siblings : Unrelated 7566 1
Actual Cousins : Unrelated 5723 0
Actual Uncle/Nephew : Unrelated 7565 5
Actual Grandparent/Grandchild : Unrelated 7562 2
Incorrectly assumed siblings : Actual unrelated 201 0
Incorrectly assumed parent/child : Actual unrelated 10 0
Incorrectly assumed uncle/half-sib/grandparent : Actual unrelated 1096 0
Incorrectly assumed cousin : Actual unrelated 2125 0
Incorrectly assumed sibling : Actual parent/child 622 0
Incorrectly assumed parent/child : Actual sibling 1000 0
What can be done to make DNA 
testing more objective?
• Distinguishing between signal and noise
• Deducing the number of contributors to 
mixtures
• Accounting for relatives
• Be mindful of the potential for human 
error
Victorian Coroner’s inquest into the 
death of Jaidyn Leskie
• Toddler disappears in bizarre 
circumstances: found dead 
six months later
• Mother’s boy friend is tried 
and acquitted.
• Unknown female profile on 
clothing.
• Cold hit to a rape victim.
• RMP: 1 in 227 million.
• Lab claims “adventitious 
match.”
Victorian Coroner’s inquest into the 
death of Jaidyn Leskie
• Condom with rape victim’s 
DNA was processed in the 
same lab 1 or 2 days prior to 
Leskie samples.
• Additional tests find matches 
at 5 to 7 more loci.
• Review of electronic data 
reveals low level 
contributions at even more 
loci.
• Degradation study further 
suggests contamination.
Degradation, inhibition
• When biological samples are exposed to adverse 
environmental conditions, they can become degraded
– Warm, moist, sunlight, time
• Degradation breaks the DNA at random
• Larger amplified regions are affected first
• Classic ‘ski-slope’ electropherogram
• Degradation and inhibition are unusual and noteworthy.  
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Degradation, inhibition
The Leskie Inquest, a practical application
• Undegraded samples can have 
“ski-slopes” too.
• How negative does a slope 
have to be to an indication of 
degradation?
• Experience, training and 
expertise.
• Positive controls should not be 
degraded.
Degradation, inhibition
The Leskie Inquest
• DNA profiles in a rape and a 
murder investigation match.
• Everyone agrees that the 
murder samples are degraded.
• If the rape sample is degraded, 
it could have contaminated the 
murder samples.
• Is the rape sample degraded?
Degradation, inhibition
The Leskie Inquest
Victorian Coroner’s inquest into the 
death of Jaidyn Leskie
“8. During the conduct of the 
preliminary investigation 
(before it was decided to 
undertake an inquest) the 
female DNA allegedly taken 
from the bib that was 
discovered with the body was 
matched with a DNA profile 
in the Victorian Police 
Forensic Science database.  
This profile was from a rape 
victim who was subsequently 
found to be unrelated to the 
Leskie case.”
Victorian Coroner’s inquest into the 
death of Jaidyn Leskie
“8. The match to the bib 
occurred as a result of 
contamination in the 
laboratory and was not an 
adventitious match.  The 
samples from the two cases 
were examined by the same 
scientist within a close time 
frame.”
www.bioforensics.com/articles/
Leskie_decision.pdf
The science of DNA profiling is 
sound.
But, not all of DNA profiling is 
science.
This is especially true in situations 
involving: small amounts of starting 
material, mixtures, relatives, and 
analyst judgment calls.
Resources
• Internet
– Forensic Bioinformatics Website: http://www.bioforensics.com/
– Applied Biosystems Website: http://www.appliedbiosystems.com/
(see human identity and forensics)
– STR base: http://www.cstl.nist.gov/biotech/strbase/ (very useful)
• Books
– ‘Forensic DNA Typing’ by John M. Butler (Academic Press)
• Scientists
– Larry Mueller (UC Irvine)
– Simon Ford (Lexigen, Inc. San Francisco, CA)
– William Shields (SUNY, Syracuse, NY)
– Mike Raymer and Travis Doom (Wright State, Dayton, OH) Marc 
Taylor (Technical Associates, Ventura, CA)
– Keith Inman (Forensic Analytical, Haywood, CA)
• Testing laboratories
– Technical Associates (Ventura, CA)
– Forensic Analytical (Haywood, CA)
• Other resources
– Forensic Bioinformatics (Dayton, OH)
